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LAND USE -AND ZONING LAW
Philip Carter Strother *
Andrew E. Tarne **
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early days of nuisance law, but especially since the
early twentieth century and the validation of zoning ordinances,
land use planning and management have been fundamental roles
of local government. As evinced by its state code, the Common-
wealth of Virginia recognizes the essential role that localities play
in land use planning. The Virginia Code requires that localities
create planning commissions,1 adopt comprehensive plans,2 and, if
the localities have adopted zoning ordinances, establish boards of
zoning appeals.4 As most of the implementation of these man-
dates is left to individual localities, the form of implementation is
not uniform but naturally varies from county to county and city to
city.
Despite the idiosyncrasies from county to county, local ordi-
nances and institutions must not contradict state-level legislation
and judgments. In Virginia, which follows Dillon's Rule, the state
government has the ultimate control over land use matters.' Lo-
* Founding Partner, Strother Law Offices, PLC, Richmond, Virginia. LL.M., 1999,
George Washington University Law School; J.D., 1997, Thomas M. Cooley Law School;
B.S., 1991, The Love School of Business, Elon University.
** J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of Richmond School of Law; BA., 2010, Universi-
ty of Virginia.
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2210 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
2. Id. § 15.2-2223 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
3. See id. § 15.2-2280 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
4. Id. § 15.2-2308 (Cum. Supp. 2011).
5. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. Confrere Club of Richmond, Va, Inc., 239 Va. 77, 79,
387 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1990) ("In determining the legislative powers of local governing bod-
ies, Virginia follows the Dillon Rule of strict construction. The Dillon Rule provides that
municipal corporations possess and can exercise only those powers expressly granted by
the General Assembly, those necessarily or fairly implied therefrom, and those that are
essential and indispensable.") (citations omitted).
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calities, essentially, may not exercise power other than that
granted by the Virginia General Assembly.' This restriction is of
special importance in the field of land use and zoning law as the
restriction prevents localities from limiting development more
strictly than permissible under the Virginia Code.] The applica-
tion of Dillon's Rule in Virginia is the source of much litigation in
the field of land use and zoning law as property owners challenge
localities that the owners believe have passed ordinances incon-
sistent with the Virginia Code. The Virginia court system, there-
fore, also plays a paramount role in influencing and interpreting
land use and zoning law in the Commonwealth. This article high-
lights selected developments in various areas of land use law that
have emerged from the General Assembly and the Supreme Court
of Virginia over the past three years.
II. SUBDIVISION OF LAND
Originally, subdivision controls were instituted to allow locali-
ties to provide for features such as accessible neighborhoods, nav-
igable street patterns, and adequate infrastructure.8 In Virginia,
localities enjoy some latitude in enacting subdivision ordinances;
however, any such ordinances must not go beyond the scope of
state-level enabling legislation.0
6. Id. (citations omitted).
7. See, e.g., id. (citations omitted).
8. JAMES A. KUSHNER, 1 SUBDMSION LAW AND GROWTH MANAGEMENT § 1:5 (2d ed.
2011).
9. See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors v. Georgetown Land Co., 204 Va. 380, 383, 131 S.E.2d
290, 292 (1963) (noting that the General Assembly "in enacting the Virginia Land Subdi-
vision Act, delegated to each locality a portion of the police power of the state, to be exer-
cised by it in determining what subdivisions would be controlled, and how they should be
regulated," and that "[t]he legislature left much to the discretion of the locality in making
such determination.").
10. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Countryside Inv. Co., 258 Va. 497, 504, 522 S.E.2d 610,
613 (1999) (noting that "pursuant to the strict construction required by the Dillon Rule,
the Board [of Supervisors of a locality] does not have unfettered discretion when deciding
what matters it may include in its subdivision ordinance. Rather, the Board must include
those requisites which are mandated in Code § 15.2-2241.").
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A. Court Decisions
1. County of Chesterfield v. Tetra Associates, LLC
In County of Chesterfield v. Tetra Associates, LLC, the Supreme
Court of Virginia ruled that localities cannot "use a subdivision
ordinance to prohibit a use of. . . property that is permitted by
the property's zoning classification."" In this case, Tetra Associ-
ates attempted to subdivide a 7.071-acre agriculturally zoned
parcel of land into five residential lots with a minimum size each
of 43,560 square feet (one acre).1" Chesterfield County denied this
request, stating that sections 17-2 and 17-36(a) of the county
subdivision ordinance prohibited residential subdivisions in agri-
cultural zones.'" Section 17.2 defined "subdivision lot" as the divi-
sion of any parcel into two or more residential lots less than five
acres large." Section 17-36(a) prohibited subdivision lots in agri-
cultural districts." Tetra sued the county, claiming that these or-
dinances were void because they attempted to regulate property
subdivision in a manner not allowed by the Virginia Code. 6
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with Tetra and held
that sections 17-2 and 17-36(a) of the county code went beyond
the scope of authority granted to Chesterfield County by the Gen-
eral Assembly." The court first noted that county code sections
19-123(a) and 19-28(f) together permitted one-acre residential
lots in agricultural districts." The court then found that the coun-
ty subdivision ordinances contradicted these sections by not al-
lowing one-acre residential lots in agricultural districts. 9 The
court concluded that the subdivision ordinances were impermis-
sible attempts to prohibit uses already allowed by the agricultur-
11. 279 Va. 500, 507, 689 S.E.2d 647, 650 (2010).
12. Id. at 503, 689 S.E.2d at 648.
13. Id. at 502-03, 689 S.E.2d at 647-48.
14. Id. at 502, 689 S.E.2d at 647.
15. See id. at 502-03, 689 S.E.2d at 647.
16. Id. at 505, 689 S.E.2d at 649.
17. Id. at 507, 689 S.E.2d at 650 (citation omitted).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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al zoning classification.2" The county subdivision ordinances,
therefore, were "violative of the Code of Virginia and void."2
2. W&WPartnership v. Prince William County Board of Zoning
Appeals
In W&WPartnership v. Prince William County Board of Zoning
Appeals, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the conveyance
of land to the Commonwealth for a road did not create a legal
subdivision of the remaining private property.22 In 1940, Bryon
and Georgette Woodside conveyed part of their single tract of
land to the Commonwealth for the extension of Route 234; the
road subsequently bisected the remainder of the Woodsides'
land.2 The deed conveying the land did not contain a description
of the Woodsides' remaining property, nor was a plat showing the
remaining property recorded. 4 In 2005, W&W Partnership
("W&W") obtained the Woodsides' remaining property, and after
subdividing and conveying a portion of it, retained 5.17 acres
north of Route 234 and 10.13 acres south of Route 234.25 W&W
petitioned Prince William County to issue a separate address and
parcel number for the 5.17 acres north of Route 234; however, the
county denied the request because a 1982 zoning ordinance only
allowed lots of at least ten acres in the A-1 district in which
W&W's land was located.2" W&W argued that the land was al-
ready legally subdivided in 1940 when the Woodsides conveyed
the 1.44-acre portion for the extension of Route 234.27 The zoning
administrator, board of zoning appeals, and circuit court all disa-
greed with W&W, each finding instead that the extension of the
road did not legally subdivide the property but rather merely cre-
ated a single parcel with two noncontiguous portions."
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 279 Va. 483, 488-89, 689 S.E.2d 739, 742 (2010).
23. Id. at 485, 689 S.E.2d at 740.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 485-86, 689 S.E.2d at 740.
27. Id. at 485, 689 S.E.2d at 740.
28. Id. at 485-86, 689 S.E.2d at 740-41.
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After reviewing controlling case law, the Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed the judgments of the lower bodies.2 9 The court
first reiterated that
the creation of a new lot "is a legal separation of property because it
results from action by the owner and involves, at a minimum, a
change in the legal description of the property, either by metes and
bounds or by plat, which is duly recorded in the appropriate land
records."30
Chesterfield County v. Stigall, a 2001 Supreme Court of Virginia
decision, involved similar facts to W&W Partnership in that the
landowner's parcel was divided when the Commonwealth,
through eminent domain, obtained some of the land and con-
structed a freeway over it.' In that case, the noncontiguous par-
cel continued to be viewed legally as a single parcel of land, and
the supreme court concluded that a physical separation is not
tantamount to a legal subdivision.32
W&W conceded that Stigall was controlling but attempted to
distinguish it because it did not involve a separation of property
due to the owner's voluntary actions." W&W argued that the vol-
untary conveyance by the Woodsides was "an 'action by the own-
er' sufficient to legally separate the 5.17 acres from the parent
tract."4 While the court agreed with the apparent distinction, the
court noted that the essential element of a legal separation is not
the action of the landowner but rather the "duly recorded...
change in the legal description of the property either by metes
and bounds or by plat." 5 As nothing in the public records indicat-
ed that the Woodsides' land was subdivided following the convey-
ance, the parcel, though physically divided, never was legally
subdivided."
29. Id. at 488-89, 689 S.E.2d at 742.
30. Id. at 487, 689 S.E.2d at 741 (quoting Chesterfield Cnty. v. Stigall, 262 Va. 697,
705, 554 S.E.2d 49, 54 (2001)).
31. Id. (citing Stigall, 262 Va. at 700, 554 S.E.2d at 51).
32. Id. (citing Stigal 262 Va. at 705-06, 554 S.E.2d at 54).
33. Id., 689 S.E.2d at 741-42.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 488, 689 S.E.2d at 742 (citing Stigall, 262 Va. at 705, 554 S.E.2d at 54).
36. Id. at 488-89, 689 S.E.2d at 742.
20121
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B. Legislation
In Senate Bill 873, the 2011 General Assembly added a new
section to Virginia Code section 15.2-2244 that permits localities
to adopt subdivision ordinances that allow for a single division of
a parcel "for the purpose of sale or gift to a member of the imme-
diate family ... of beneficiaries of a trust, [or] of land held in
trust."37 All trust beneficiaries must (i) be immediate family
members, (ii) agree to subdivide the property, and (iii) agree,
through a restrictive covenant placed on the property, to prohibit
the transfer of the property to anyone who is not an immediate
family member for fifteen years."
III. HISTORIC PRESERVATION
In the Historic Preservation Act of 1966, Congress declared
that "the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation should
be preserved as a living part of our community life and develop-
ment in order to give a sense of orientation to the American peo-
ple."3 That same year, the Commonwealth of Virginia established
the Virginia Historic Landmarks Commission, the predecessor to
the Virginia Department of Historic Resources." Twelve years
later, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the validity
of state and local historic preservation ordinances in Penn Cen-
tral Transportation Co. v. City of New York.41 To this day, historic
preservation continues to be of interest in the field of land use
law, often finding landowners' desire to use their property as they
wish in opposition to localities' attempt to preserve the historic
character of their communities.
37. S.B. 873, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2011) (enacted as Act of Mar. 15, 2011, ch.
141, 2011 Va. Acts 223).
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2244.1 (Repl. Vol. 2012). The fifteen-year nontransfer period
may be reduced by a locality "when changed circumstances so require." Id.
39. 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(2) (2006).
40. See VA. DEP'T OF HISTORIC RES., VIRGINIA'S HISTORIcAL REGISTERS: A GUIDE FOR
PROPERTY OWNERS (2007), http://www.dhr.virginia.gov/pdf files/VirginiaProperty-Own
ersGuideUpdated_2007.pdf.
41. 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978) (internal citations omitted).
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A. Court Decision: Covel v. Town of Vienna
In Covel v. Town of Vienna, the Supreme Court of Virginia
ruled on the constitutionality of Vienna's general historic districts
ordinance ("HDO") and its specific Windover Heights Historic
District ('VHHD") ordinance. 2 This case arose when Vienna de-
nied Michael Covel a certificate of appropriateness ("COA") to
erect a fence on his property within WHHD.43 Covel had applied
for the COA but declined to properly fill out the application or
provide additional information when requested." In addition to
denying the COA, Vienna had denied Covel and other landowners
their requests to have their parcels removed from the WHHD."
The circuit court consolidated these various cases and an appeal
was brought to the Supreme Court of Virginia.46 In the consoli-
dated case, the landowners argued that (i) Vienna arbitrarily de-
nied Covel's COA,"7 (ii) the WHHD ordinance was unconstitution-
ally vague,48 (iii) the HDO was violative of the Virginia Code,"
and (iv) the WHHD ordinance was violative of the Vienna Town
Code.50
Applying a fairly debatable standard, the Supreme Court of
Virginia first ruled that Covel's COA was appropriately denied."'
The court noted that Covel had not presented any evidence to re-
butthe presumption of validity of Vienna's denial, but rather he
had only argued that both ordinances were invalid." Regarding
the COA, the court reiterated its holding in Norton v. City of
Danville and stated that the court did not have the authority to
consider the validity of an ordinance on an appeal from a COA
denial."3
42. 280 Va. 151, 154, 694 S.E.2d 609, 611 (2010).
43. Id. at 155, 694 S.E.2d at 612.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 156, 694 S.E.2d at 612.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 157, 694 S.E.2d at 613.
48. Id. at 162-63, 694 S.E.2d at 616.
49. Id. at 158, 694 S.E.2d at 613-14.
50. Id. at 160, 694 S.E.2d at 615.
51. Id. at 157-58, 694 S.E.2d at 613.
52. Id. at 157, 694 S.E.2d at 613.
53. Id. (citing Norton v. City of Danville, 268 Va. 402, 407-08, 602 S.E.2d 126, 129
(2004)).
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Turning to the validity of the HDO, the court held that the or-
dinance was not ultra vires and therefore was valid. 4 The land-
owners argued that the HDO was invalid because it defined an
'"area' rather than buildings or structures."5 Examining former
Virginia Code sections 15.1-503.2(a) and 15.1-430(b) (in effect
when Vienna adopted the HDO), the court found that the General
Assembly clearly had intended to allow localities to create histor-
ic areas, even those that do not include buildings or structures."'
Specifically, the court noted that former code section 15.1-503.2(a)
allowed localities "to delineat[e] one or more historic districts ad-
jacent to such landmarks, buildings and structures, or encom-
passing such historic areas.""
Regarding the validity of the WHHD ordinance, the court found
that, in light of section 15.2-1427(C) of the Virginia Code, the or-
dinance had been validly adopted ." The landowners argued that
the WHHD ordinance was adopted improperly because it did not
follow the strict adoption requirements of the Vienna Town
Code.59 Citing section 15.2-1427(C), the court held that any ordi-
nances adopted by a governing body have been adopted validly
unless the adoption violates either the United States Constitution
or the Virginia Constitution."'
Finally, addressing the constitutional challenge to the WHHD
Ordinance, the court held that the ordinance was not unconstitu-
tionally vague."5 The court promptly disposed of the landowners'
challenge by noting that the WHHD ordinance and COA applica-
tion included very specific instructions for submitting a COA.6" As
54. See id. at 158, 694 S.E.2d at 613-14.
55. Id., 694 S.E.2d at 613.
56. Id. at 159-60, 694 S.E.2d at 614 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-503.2(a) (Cum.
Supp. 1978) (authorizing governing bodies of counties to establish historic district zones);
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-430(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (defining "historic area")).
57. Id. at 160, 694 S.E.2d at 614-15 (alteration in original) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. §
15.1-503.2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. Id. at 160-61, 694 S.E.2d at 615 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1427(c) (Repl. Vol.
2008) (providing that all ordinances adopted by a governing body shall be deemed validly
adopted in the absence of state or federal constitutional violations)).
59. Id. at 160, 694 S.E.2d at 615.
60. Id. at 161, 694 S.E.2d at 615.
61. Id. at 165, 694 S.E.2d at 617.
62. Id. at 164, 694 S.E.2d at 617.
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Covel disregarded these instructions in his application, the court
found that this was not a case in which Vienna had considered
the "application and applied vague criteria subjectively to arrive
at an arbitrary or discriminatory result."63 As the town previous-
ly had denied the application for incompleteness, the fault was
Covel's, not an alleged unconstitutional vagueness in the ordi-
nance.
64
B. Legislation: Historic Districts
In House Bill 1137, the General Assembly amended section
15.2-2306 of the Virginia Code to include stricter requirements
for establishing local historic districts." Prior to establishing or
expanding historic districts, localities must now (i) inventory all
landmarks, buildings, or structures in the district, (ii) allow for
public input from the owners of affected properties, (iii) provide
written criteria being used to determine which properties are to
be included in the district, and (iv) compare the inventory and the
criteria to determine which properties meet the criteria for inclu-
sion in a historic district.6 Furthermore, localities only may cre-
ate historic districts in areas where a majority of properties meet
the criteria." If, however, a given property is located along an ar-
terial street or highway that is "a significant routen of tourist ac-
cess," a locality may include it in a historic district notwithstand-
ing the above requirements.
IV. CONDEMNATION
While the exercise of eminent domain is often a contentious is-
sue, the power of a sovereign to practice it is not in question.69
The Supreme Court of Virginia has said that eminent domain is
"a high prerogative right, and there is no doubt about the power
of the State to exercise it, or to delegate it to subordinate agencies
63. Id. at 165, 694 S.E.2d at 617.
64. Id.
65. See H.B. 1137, Va. Gen. Assembly (Ex. Sess. 2012) (enacted as Act of Apr. 18,
2012, ch. 790, 2012 Va. Acts __....
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2306(C) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Light v. City of Danville, 168 Va. 181, 196, 190 S.E. 276, 281 (1937).
20121
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to be exercised in proper proceedings for the public welfare.""0 The
state, however, must exercise such power carefully, and the
courts must strictly construe the statutes granting that power to
the state.71 Especially in light of its contentious nature, both the
condemning authority and the property owner must follow the
specific statutory procedures when eminent domain is exercised.72
A. Court Decisions
1. Dean v. Board of County Supervisors of Prince William County
In Dean v. Board of County Supervisors of Prince William
County, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the circuit court
did not err in prohibiting the admission of evidence of an involun-
tary sale in an eminent domain proceeding.73 In this case, Prince
William County had begun condemnation proceedings against
Dean's property because he and the county were unable to agree
on compensation for his property, which the county needed for the
local transportation commission.74 Dean proffered evidence of a
"purported comparable sale of property" between Sultan Aman
and the county, which the county sought to exclude.75 In the
Aman sale, the county had negotiated with Aman and eventually
settled on a price higher than their original offer in order "to
avoid any risk or time and expense of going to court."76 According
to Virginia law, similar sales are only admissible as evidence in
condemnation proceedings if such sales were "voluntary and free
from compulsion and not by way of compromise.""7
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that evidence of the Aman
sale was not admissible because it was not fully voluntary. 8 The
court recognized that the sale may have been voluntary from
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. 281 Va. 536, 540, 708 S.E.2d 830, 832 (2011).
74. Id. at 538, 708 S.E.2d at 831.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 538-39, 708 S.E.2d at 832.
77. Id. at 540, 708 S.E.2d at 832-33.
78. Id. at 541, 708 S.E.2d at 833.
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Aman's perspective, seeing as he had negotiated with the county;
however, it determined that Dean had not shown that the sale
was voluntary from the perspective of the county.79 The court first
found that the county was under compulsion to buy Aman's prop-
erty because the county needed the property for a road project."
Furthermore, the county had compromised extensively with
Aman because it wanted to avoid the time and expenses of court
proceedings.8 As the county was under compulsion to acquire
Aman's property and did so only after extensive compromise, the
sale was not fully voluntary. 2 Accordingly, the court held that ev-
idence of the sale could be excluded in the present trial proceed-
ings."
2. Taco Bell of America, Inc. v. Commonwealth Transportation
Commissioner of Virginia
In Taco Bell of America, Inc. v. Commonwealth Transportation
Commissioner of Virginia, the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that even if elements of a condemned property are moveable,
whether such elements are fixtures or personalty is a jury ques-
tion.84 In this case, a parcel of land in Fairfax County containing a
Taco Bell restaurant was condemned by the Commonwealth in
order to allow for the reconstruction of Route 29.8" To determine
the just compensation owed to Taco Bell, the Commonwealth
transportation commissioner filed a motion in limine prior to the
trial to exclude evidence of the value of several pieces of equip-
ment "used in the restaurant as part of Taco Bell's business."6
Ultimately, the trial judge determined that this equipment was
''purely personal property," and that the jury was not authorized
to determine its value in connection with the just compensation
owed to Taco Bell.8  Taco Bell appealed, arguing that the jury
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 541-42, 708 S.E.2d at 833.
84. 282 Va. 127, 133, 710 S.E.2d 478, 482 (2011).
85. Id. at 129, 710 S.E.2d at 479.
86. Id., 710 S.E.2d at 480.
87. Id. at 131, 710 S.E.2d at 481.
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should have been permitted to consider the equipment's value in
determining just compensation."8
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with Taco Bell and re-
versed the trial court's ruling.89 The court first noted that when
determining whether property is personal or a fixture, courts
should weigh: (i) the actual or constructive annexation of the
property to the real estate, (ii) the essential nature of the proper-
ty to the use of the real estate, and (iii) the property owner's in-
tention to make the property a permanent addition to the real es-
tate.g The court stated that the trial court improperly based its
decision to exclude the evidence solely on the fact that the proper-
ty was moveable.91 Applying the three-part fixture test, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia noted that, while the equipment was
moveable, it was also essential for the operation of the restau-
rant.92 The equipment included chairs, ovens, freezers, and a neon
sign-all of which were needed for the structure to operate as a
restaurant.93 Furthermore, the court noted that Taco Bell intend-
ed for the equipment to remain with the real estate for the life of
the restaurant; in other words, the property was a permanent ad-
dition.94 As Taco Bell satisfied two of the three fixture factors, the
court ultimately held that the fixtures' values should have been
decided upon by the jury in determining the just compensation
due to Taco Bell. 5
B. Amendments to the Virginia Constitution
In early 2012, the General Assembly approved a bill that
placed an amendment to article I, section 11 of the Virginia Con-
stitution on the November 2012 ballot.96 This amendment, if ap-
88. Id.
89. Id. at 133, 710 S.E.2d at 492.
90. Id. at 131-32, 710 S.E.2d at 481 (citing Danville Holding Corp. v. Clement, 178
Va. 223, 232, 16 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1941)).
91. Id. (citing Danville Holding Corp., 178 Va. at 232, 16 S.E.2d at 349).
92. Id. at 133, 710 S.E.2d at 482.
93. Id. at 132-33, 710 S.E,2d at 481-82.
94. Id. at 133, 710 S.E.2d at 482.
95. Id.
96. H.J. Res. 3, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2012) (enacted as Act of Feb. 27, 2012,
ch. 736, 2012 Va. Acts __).
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proved by the citizens of the Commonwealth, would change sec-
tion 11 to provide further protections against the taking of pri-
vate property.97
The amendment first adds the language "or damaging" to sec-
tion 11, thus extending protections to the damage of private prop-
erty in addition to an actual taking.8 The amendment next
strikes the existing "takings" language and adds a new paragraph
to section 11 which states, "[T]he General Assembly shall pass no
law whereby private property, the right to which is fundamental,
shall be damaged or taken except for public use.... without just
compensation to the owner thereof."99 The amendment further
provides that "[j]ust compensation shall be no less than the value
of the property taken, lost profits and lost access, and damages to
the residue caused by the taking.""'
Seemingly in response to the Supreme Court of the United
States' decision in Kelo u. City of New London,'' the amendment
also clarifies what uses are public.0 2 The amendment specifically
states that a taking or damaging "is not for public use if the pri-
mary use is for private gain, private benefit, private enterprise,
increasing jobs, increasing tax revenue, or economic development,
except for the elimination of a public nuisance existing on the
property."'0 3 So as not to interfere with the development of public
utilities and common carrier services, the amendment also states
that when a public company or corporation, or a railroad exercis-
es eminent domain, the use is public if it "is for the authorized
provision of utility, common carrier, or railroad services."1 4 Over-
all, the comprehensive language of the amendment effectively
precludes Virginia jurisdictions from taking or damaging proper-
ty in a way authorized by Kelo.
97. See id.; see also, Julian Walker, Va. Referendum May Curtail Eminent Domain
Power, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (July 17, 2012), http:/Ihamptonroads.con/2012/07/va-referendum-
may-curtail-eminent-domain-power.
98. H.J. Res. 3.
99. Id.
100, Id. '"[Llost profits' and 'lost access' are to be defined by the General Assembly." Id.
101. 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005) (affirming New London's ability to transfer land be-
tween two private owners and ruling that the contemplated redevelopment project was a
public use).
102. See Walker, supra note 97 (noting that since 2007 the General Assembly has been
moving to narrow eminent domain powers in the wake of the 2005 Kelo decision).
103. H.J. Res. 3. Furthermore, the burden of proving that a use is public is on the con-
demnor. Id.
104. Id.
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V. UNIFORMITY REQUIREMENTS
Almost all state zoning enabling acts have provisions for uni-
formity,"5 and Virginia is no exception."' Uniformity require-
ments typically are enacted to ensure that zoning is not used for
discriminatory purposes-favoring or disfavoring certain similar-
ly situated parcels and landowners over others.0 7 Uniformity re-
quirements often are challenged as unreasonable or arbitrary
when applied to certain parcels within a district that cannot read-
ily meet the uniformity standard."8
A. Court Decisions: Schefer v. City Council
In Schefer v. City Council, the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that a city ordinance establishing different height restrictions on
standard and sub-standard lots within the same residential zon-
ing district was constitutionally and statutorily valid.1 9 Anton
Schefer owned several lots, each less than 7500 square feet in ar-
ea, in an Ri-B zoning district in the City of Falls Church."i The
Falls Church City Code required that all lots in the Ri-B district
be at least 7500 square feet in area; however, Schefer created his
lots prior to the adoption of that requirement."' Falls Church
dubbed lots of 7500 square feet or more "standard lots" and lots
less than 7500 square feet "substandard lots.""' 2 In 2006, Falls
Church adopted a set of height regulations applying only to sub-
standard lots."3 The ultimate result of these regulations was that
the maximum allowable building height in standard lots would be
thirty-five feet while the maximum allowable height in substand-
ard lots would be a ratio of the ground area to thirty-five feet.1
4
Following enactment of the regulations, Schefer surveyed the
height and lot area of one of his substandard lots and found that
105. See PATRICIA E. SALKIN, 1 AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 6:25 (5th ed. 2012).
106. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2282 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
107. See SALKIN, supra note 105.
108. See id.
109. 279 Va. 588, 594-96, 691 S.E.2d 778, 782 (2010).
110. Id. at 591, 691 S.E.2d at 779.
111. -d. (citation omitted)).
112. See id., 691 S.E.2d at 779-80 (citation omitted).
113. Id. (citing FALLS CHURCH CITY, VA., CODE § 38-28(b)(2) (as amended Dec. 11,
2006)).
114. Id., 691 S.E.2d at 780.
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the building was taller than the new ratio allowed." ' He subse-
quently filed suit against Falls Church, arguing that the regula-
tions violated section 15.2-2282 of the Virginia Code and deprived
him of equal protection under the law."6
Section 15.2-2282 of the Virginia Code requires that "[a]ll zon-
ing regulations ... be uniform for each class or kind of building[]
and use[] throughout each district.' 7 Schefer argued that section
15.2-2282 required identical height restrictions for all lots in the
Ri-B district."1 Specifically, Schefer argued that all one-family
dwellings in the Ri-B district are uses of the same class or kind,
and therefore that they all must be under identical height re-
strictions."9 The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed, concluding
instead that dwellings on standard lots and dwellings on sub-
standard lots are two different types of uses, despite both being
residential and within the Ri-B district.' Classifying standard
residential lots as different uses from substandard residential
lots, the court held that the height regulations did "not violate the
uniformity requirement of Code § 15.2-2282. '11
The court also quickly disposed of Schefer's equal protection
claim by reiterating that when an individual challenges a zoning
ordinance, "[tihe burden of proof is on him.., to prove that it is
clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. 122 Instead of provid-
ing evidence to this effect, Schefer merely alleged that the regula-
tions were facially discriminatory.' The court found that nothing
in the regulations was inherently suspect or an infringement on a
fundamental right; therefore, the equal protection claim had to
fail because Schefer had not presented sufficient evidence to
counter the presumption of validity.'24
115. Id. at 592, 691 S.E.2d at 780.
116. Id.
117. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2282 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
118. 279 Va. at 592, 691 S.E.2d at 780.
119. Id. at 594, 691 S.E.2d at 781-82.
120. Id. at 594-95, 691 S.E.2d at 782.
121. Id. at 595, 691 S.E.2d at 782.
122. Id. (quoting Bd. of City Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 660, 107 S.E.2d 390,
395 (1959)).
123. See id. at 596, 691 S.E.2d at 782.
124. Id.
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VI. ZONING PROCEDURE
A. Court Decisions
1. Waivers, Special Exceptions, and the Role of Planning
Commissions
In Sinclair v. New Cingular Wireless PCS, the Supreme Court
of Virginia held that a provision allowing for waivers from a zon-
ing ordinance is not ultra vires but that a procedure allowing a
planning commission to review waiver applications is.1 2  In this
case, Kent Sinclair's neighbor contracted with Cingular Wireless
to install a cellular phone tower on her property, which sat on a
critical slope.12 The Albemarle County Code normally restricts
construction on critical slopes;127 however, the code also provides
for individuals to obtain a waiver allowing construction from the
local planning commission.2 ' The planning commission's ruling
on the waiver may only be appealed to the board of supervisors by
the applicant if the waiver is denied or subject to conditions objec-
tionable to the applicant.26 Over Sinclair's objections to the plan-
ning commission, New Cingular successfully obtained a waiver in
February 2010.12" Sinclair subsequently filed suit, claiming that
the waiver provision exceeded the scope of powers delegated by
the General Assembly. 131
The Supreme Court of Virginia first found that the waiver pro-
vision was permitted lawfully by the General Assembly because
Virginia Code section 15.2-2286(A)(3) allows localities to grant
"special exceptions under suitable regulations and safeguards in
a zoning ordinance."'32 Sinclair argued that the waiver was not a
special exception but rather a variance, and thus subject to the
125. 283 Va. 198, 208-09, 720 S.E.2d 543, 549 (2012).
126. Id. at 201, 720 S.E.2d at 544-45 (explaining that a critical slope is land with
slopes of twenty-five percent or more).
127. See ALBEMARLE COUNTY, VA., CODE § 18.4.2 (2012).
128. See id. § 18.4.2.5(a).
129. See id. § 18 4.2.5(a)(5).
130. 283 Va. at 202, 720 S.E.2d at 545.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 205, 720 S.E.2d at 547 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2286(A)(3) (Repl. Vol.
2012)).
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provisions of Virginia Code sections 15.2-2309(2) and 15.2-2286
(A)(4)."' The court distinguished the waiver provision from a var-
iance, stating that "where 'the property may be developed in a
way consistent with the ordinance, but only with approval of the
[ocalityl after specified conditions are met,' a variance is not nec-
essary."'3 4 As the waiver was more analogous to a special excep-
tion, which was specifically permitted by the Virginia Code, the
allowance of a waiver was not beyond the scope of the county's
power.
The actual procedure for obtaining the waiver, however, violat-
ed Dillon's Rule.3 5 The court held that the General Assembly did
not intend for localities to allow planning commissions to author-
ize departures from zoning ordinances; rather, only zoning ad-
ministrators and boards of zoning appeals may authorize depar-
tures.3 Planning commissions have broad advisory powers but
lack executive, legislative, or judicial power.3 7 The court noted
that the Virginia Code expressly authorizes only zoning adminis-
trators, boards of zoning appeals, and local governing bodies to
approve modifications or departures from zoning ordinances. 38 As
the Virginia Code does not permit planning commissions to rule
on departures from zoning ordinances, the procedure for obtain-
ing the waiver was void and violative of the Virginia Code. 38
2. Amendment of Rezoning Proffers
In Arogas, Inc. v. Frederick County Board of Zoning Appeals,
the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a county is not required
to hold an additional public hearing on amending a rezoning prof-
133. Id. at 202-03, 720 S.E.2d at 545.
134. Id. at 204, 720 S.E.2d at 546 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell v. City Council,
224 Va. 490, 496, 297 S.E.2d 810, 814 (1982)).
135. Id. at 205, 720 S.E.2d at 547.
136. Id. at 206, 720 S.E.2d at 547.
137. Id. (citing VA. CODEANN. § 15.2-2210 (Repl. Vol. 2012)).
138. Id. at 208, 720 S.E.2d at 548-49 (citations omitted); see also VA. COnE ANN. § 15.2-
2286(A)(4) (Cur. Supp. 2011) CWhere provided by ordinance, the zoning administrator
may be authorized to grant a modification from any provision contained in the 2oning or-
dinance . . . . 'I; id. § 15.2-2310 (Repl, Vol. 2008) ("Applications for special exceptions...
shall be transmitted promptly to the secretary of the board [of zoning appeals] who shall
place the matter on the docket to be acted upon by the board [of zoning appeals]."); id. §
15.2-2286(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2011) ("[T]he governing body of any locality may reserve unto
itself the right to issue such special exceptions.").
139. Sinclair, 283 Va. at 208-09, 720 S.E.2d at 548-49 (citations omitted).
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fer after the initial public hearing, and that a circuit court is cor-
rect to reject a plaintiff's request that the circuit court usurp the
role of a local zoning administrator.1° In this case, Arogas sought
to construct a diesel and gasoline fuel station on a piece of proper-
ty that Arogas purchased from the Sempeles in March 2007.'"
The zoning administrator refused to process Arogas' site plan ap-
plication, however, because that parcel of land was bound by a
proffer prohibiting the sale of diesel fuel to "over the road truck
carrier[s]" submitted by the Sempeles when they owned the
land. 2 The Sempeles had submitted this proffer prior to a rezon-
ing hearing in 2004.1'3 The proffer was discussed at a public hear-
ing but subsequently was amended by the board of supervisors
following the close of the hearings.4 4 As the amended proffer was
adopted without a subsequent public hearing on the amend-
ments, Arogas argued that the proffer was invalid for violating
Frederick County Code section 165-13(A).' 45 Following the denial
to process its application, Arogas petitioned the circuit court to
review the application itself.'46
The Supreme Court of Virginia first held that the proffer was
valid despite the lack of an additional public hearing. 7 The court
found that subsequent public hearings are not required for
amendments to proffers based on the language of Frederick
County Code sections 165-11 and 165-13."' Section 165-13 of the
county code merely required public hearings for initial proffers,
not amendments to proffers.4 9 Furthermore, section 165-11 of the
county code allowed for the board to "make appropriate changes
or corrections" to proffers without requiring the board to hold an
additional public hearing."' Accordingly, the court also noted that
Virginia Code section 15.2-2285(C) only required that localities
140. 280 Va. 221, 228-30, 698 S.E.2d 908, 912-13 (2010) (citation omitted).
141. Id. at 225, 698 S.E.2d at 910.
142. Id. at 225-26, 698 S.E.2d at 910-11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. Id. at 224-25, 698 S.E.2d at 910.
144. Id. at 225, 698 S.E.2d at 910.
145. Id., 698 S.E.2d at 911.
146. See id. at 230, 698 S.E.2d at 913.
147. See id. at 228, 698 S.E.2d at 912.
148. See id. at 227, 698 S.E.2d at 912.
149. See id. at 226, 698 S.E.2d at 911 (citation omitted).
150. See id. (citation omitted).
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hold "at least one public hearing" before adopting a zoning ordi-
nance or proffer."'
Addressing Arogas' argument that the circuit court should
have reviewed the site plan application itself, the court held that
the judiciary did not have the power to do so.'52 The court ruled
that the zoning administrator should have reviewed Arogas'
properly submitted site plan; however, the court stated that the
judiciary itself is not empowered to review site plans.'
B. Legislation: Notice of Zoning Determinations
In House Bill 1844, the General Assembly amended sections
15.2-2204, 15.2-2301, and 15.2-2311 of the Virginia Code, and al-
tered the notice provisions for local zoning determinations. 15 4 The
bill first amended section 15.2-2204 by adding subsection (H),
which provides for notification procedures when third parties ap-
ply for a zoning determination."' Subsection (H) states that when
a third party requests a zoning determination from an adminis-
trative officer or the board of zoning appeals, the owner of the
property in question must be given written notice within ten days
of the receipt of the request.' 6 Notice must be given by either an
administrative officer or, at the direction of an administrator, the
third party making the request.'57 Mailing written notice to the
owner at his last known address as shown in real estate assess-
ment records satisfies this notice requirement."'
The bill next amended section 15.2-2301 to provide that deci-
sions made by local governing bodies following appeals to the zon-
ing administrator are binding only on property owners if the
owners receive actual written notification of the body's decision.1
5
1
151. Id. at 228, 698 S.E.2d at 912 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2285(C) (Cum. Supp.
2010)).
152. Id. at 230, 698 S.E.2d at 913.
153. See id. (internal citation omitted).
154. H.B. 1844, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2011) (enacted as Act of Mar. 24, 2011,
ch. 457, 2011 Va. Acts 716).
155. Id.
156. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2204(H) (Cum. Supp. 2011). However, subsection (H) does
exempt "inquiries from the governing body, planning commission, or employees of the lo-
cality made in the normal course of business." Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. H.B. 1844, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2011) (enacted as Act of Mar. 24, 2011,
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Finally, the bill amended section 15.2-2311(A) to provide that
appellate decisions made by the board of zoning appeals are bind-
ing only upon property owners if the owners have actual
knowledge of the zoning violation or written order of the zoning
administrator."' If, however, the property owner has actual
knowledge of either the violation or written order, that knowledge
will act as a waiver to his right to challenge the board's decision
over failure to receive notice.161
VII. ROADS AND TRANSPORTATION
As Virginia's population continues to grow, the importance of
not simply roads, but integrated transportation networks, will in-
crease in the coming years.162 With that growing importance, it is
essential that individuals know which thoroughfares are public
and which are private, and that localities know what their role is
in a larger statewide transportation network.
A. Court Decisions: Dykes v. Friends of the C.C.C. Road
In Dykes v. Friends of the C. C. C. Road, the Supreme Court of
Virginia ruled that long and continued public use of a private
road cannot convert that private property into public property.6 3
The facts of this case concern a road that the Civilian Conserva-
tion Corps ("C.C.C.") constructed on private property in the late
1930s.' Both parties stipulated that "[s]ince its construction, the
road has been used by the general public as a thoroughfare" and
that local county officers "consider[ed] it as a public road and...
used the road for at least 25 years for official purposes.""16 Alt-
hough the road was in general use by both the public and county
ch. 457, 2011 Va. Acts 716).
160. Id.
161. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2311(A) (Cum. Supp. 2011).
162. See KAREN J. RAE, VA. DEP'T OF RAIL & PUm. TRANsP., THE VIRGINIA STATE RAIL
PLAN: A MULTIMODAL STRATEGY TO MEET THE COMMONWEALTH'S PASSENGER AND
FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION NEEDS THROUGH 2025, SR-1 (2004), http://www/drpt.virginia.
gov/activities/files/FR5-DRPT-VSRP-Summary-report.pdf.
163. 283 Va. 306, 313, 720 S.E.2d 537, 541 (2012).
164. Id. at 309, 720 S.E.2d at 539.
165. Id. at 309-10, 720 S.E.2d at 539.
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officials, no records indicated that either the county or the Virgin-
ia Department of Public Transportation ("V-DOT ) ever officially
adopted the road into either the county or the state road sys-
tem.166 Believing the road to be private, Dykes and the other own-
ers of the property (the "Property Owners") restricted public ac-
cess to the road by erecting pole gates. 16 7 Thereafter, the Friends
of the C.C.C. Road sought an injunction requiring the Property
Owners to remove the pole gates.' The circuit court issued an
opinion letter ruling that the road was private, but that the pub-
lic was entitled to its unrestricted use; therefore, it ultimately is-
sued an order requiring the Property Owners to remove the pole
gates.'69 Both parties appealed.70
The Supreme Court of Virginia began its analysis by holding
that the C.C.C. Road was indeed on private property and that
there had been neither a dedication nor an acceptance to estab-
lish the road as a public road.'71 The court noted that there must
be an unmistakable showing of intent on part "of the landowner
to permanently give up his property" to the public.' The court
found that there was no such showing of intent by the present
landowners, and so the road remained private. "' Furthermore,
the court explicitly held that "I[t]he law of this Commonwealth
simply does not allow for a conversion of private property to pub-
lic property solely by public use."'74 Continuous public use does
not equate to the formal dedication and acceptance of a private
road as a public one.' 7'
The court also rejected the claim that the road was made public
through a prescriptive easement.' 6 Again, the court focused on
the elements of dedication and acceptance. The court noted that a
166. Id. at 310, 720 S.E.2d at 539.
167. Id. at 309, 720 S.E.2d at 539.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 310-11, 720 S.E.2d at 540.
170. Id. at 311, 720 S.E.2d at 540.
171. Id. at 312, 720 S.E.2d at 540-41.
172. Id. (quoting Mulford v. Walnut Hill Farm Grp., LLc, 282 Va. 98, 106, 712 S.E.2d
468, 473 (2011)).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 313, 720 S.E.2d at 541,
175. Id.
176. See id. at 314-15, 720 S.E.2d at 542-43.
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conversion of private property into public property by prescription
only occurs when a dedication can be implied by long and contin-
uous public use and when a competent local authority has accept-
ed that dedication. 171 If there has been no dedication and ac-
ceptance, public use of a private road merely shows "a license by
the owner permitting the use. ' 78 Ultimately, the court found for
the Property Owners and held that they may continue to bar pub-
lic access to the road with pole gates."'
B. Legislation: Transportation Planning
In House Bill 1248, the General Assembly amended section
15.2-2223 of the Virginia Code to provide for better integration
between regional planning, comprehensive planning, and trans-
portation planning. 8 ' The bill added the requirement that local
transportation plans be consistent with VDOT's Six-Year Im-
provement Program."8 ' Prior to adopting a transportation plan, a
locality must submit the proposed plan to VDOT, which then has
ninety days to comment on the plan's consistency with the Six-
Year Improvement Program.'82
VIII. CEMETERIES
The final internment of human remains is an important fea-
ture of any civilization, and one that perhaps often is overlooked
and not thought of as a division of land use law. In a state such as
Virginia, however, where ancient sites, battlefields, and historic
homes abound, the creation and classification of cemeteries is es-
pecially poignant.
In Shilling v. Baker, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
the scattering of cremated human remains ("cremains") and the
erection of memorial plaques on a piece of land do not operate to
177. Id. at 315, 720 S.E.2d at 542 (quoting Bd. of Supervisors v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.,
119 Va. 763, 773, 91 S.E. 124, 128 (1916)).
178. Id.
179. Id., 720 S.E.2d at 543.
180. H.B. 1248, Va. Gen. Assembly (Ex. Sess. 2012) (enacted as Act of Apr. 9, 2012, ch.
729, 2012 Va. Acts ..
181. Id.
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2223(5)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
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establish that land as a cemetery. 83 The facts of this case involve
a tract of land on top of a hill owned by the Baker family.1 4 Be-
ginning in 1949, and covering two generations, this hilltop was
used as a scattering ground for the ashes of deceased Baker fami-
ly members.'85 Memorial plaques, a small rope fence, and a larger
forty-square-foot wrought iron fence all were placed on the tract
by family members." 6 The land actually was owned by Brian
Baker; however, he allowed his sister, Kathryn Shilling, to bury
an urn containing her mother's ashes on the site next to their
grandparents' ashes. 7 In 2007, Baker contracted to sell his entire
parcel of land, which included the hilltop site." The sale was con-
tingent upon Baker relocating the "cemetery" to the base of the
hill.9 Shilling opposed the relocation of the "cemetery" and filed
suit, asking the court to declare the hilltop site to be a legally offi-
cial cemetery.' Following a decision by the local board of zoning
appeals and the circuit court, the Supreme Court of Virginia was
asked to decide "whether the actions of Shilling and her family
established a legal cemetery."' 91
The court ultimately held that the spreading and internment of
cremains on the site did not operate to create a legal cemetery."'
Shilling first argued that the common law elements to establish a
cemetery should be dispositive because the first cremains were
spread in 1949, thirty-five years before the adoption of the rele-
vant county ordinance governing cemeteries.' 9' Shilling argued
that at common law, a family cemetery could be established by (i)
the appropriation of land for use as a cemetery, (ii) internment of
family members on the property, (iii) setting off of that land, and
(iv) the erection of markers on the site.' 4 Shilling argued that an
actual "'burial' of remains was not inherent in the concept of a
183. 279 Va. 720, 728, 691 S.E.2d 806, 810 (2010).
184. Id. at 722-23, 691 S.E.2d at 807.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 722, 691 S.E.2d at 807.
188. Id. at 723, 691 S.E.2d at 807.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 725, 691 S.E.2d at 809.
192. Id. at 728, 691 S.E.2d at 810.
193. Id. at 726, 691 S.E.2d at 809.
194. Id. (citing Heiligman v. Chambers, 338 P.2d 144, 146-48 (Okla. 1959)).
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cemetery under the common law."'99 The court disagreed, howev-
er, and noted that the site at question in Heiligman v. Chambers,
a 1959 case from Oklahoma, contained the buried remains of
three bodies.' 96
The court next rejected Shilling's argument that under the Vir-
ginia Code cemeteries do not require burials.'97 Shilling argued
that section 54.1-2310 defined a cemetery as any land used for
the internment of human remains.' Shilling contended that the
spreading of cremains qualified as a "final disposal of human re-
mains,"'9 and thus as a legal internment.2 0 The court disagreed,
however, and noted that the final sentence of the definition of in-
ternment stated that "[t]he sprinkling of ashes on church grounds
shall not constitute internment." '' The court ultimately held that
internment is essential to the creation of a cemetery; as no in-
ternment had occurred on the hilltop site, no legal cemetery had
been created."'
IX. CLUSTER DEVELOPMENTS
Cluster developments are essentially subdivisions that allow
for higher density development in a certain district so long as the
development is clustered together, leaving the rest of the district
as open space.202 Cluster developments are seen as having many
potential benefits and a solution to problems faced by ever-
increasing development and decreasing open space. 20 4 Through re-
cent legislation, the General Assembly has attempted to make it
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing Heiligman, 338 P.2d at 147).
197. Id. at 727, 691 S.E.2d at 810.
198. Id. at 726, 691 S.E.2d at 809; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2310 (Repl. Vol. 2009)
(defining "internment" as "all forms of final disposal of human remains").
199. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2310.
200. Shilling, 279 Va. at 726, 691 S.E.2d at 809-10.
201. Id. at 727, 691 S.E.2d at 810 (alteration in original) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. §
54.1-2310 (Repl. Vol. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
202. Id. at 727-28, 691 S.E.2d at 810.
203. See Patricia E. Salkin, Zoning and Land Use Planning, 36 REAL ESTATE L. J. 628,
639-40 (2007).
204. See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin, Sustainability and Land Use Planning: Greening
State and Local Land Use Plans and Regulations to Address Climate Change Challenges
and Preserve Resources for Future Generations, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
121, 148 (2009); Cluster/Conservation Development, U. ILL. EXTENSION, http://urbanext.
illinois.edu/lcr/cluster.cfm.
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easier for developers to obtain local approval to construct cluster
developments.
In House Bill 1931, the General Assembly amended section
15.2-2286.1 of the Virginia Code to prohibit localities from placing
certain requirements on cluster developments.0 5 Subsection (B)
now specifically allows localities to subject cluster developments
to applicable land use ordinances; however, subsection (B) prohib-
its localities from imposing "more stringent land use require-
ments" on cluster developments.2 6 Furthermore, localities now
are prohibited from denying the extension of water or sewer lines
from adjacent properties to cluster developments, so long as the
development is "located within an area designated for water and
sewer service" by the locality.' Finally, for any "open space" or
"conservation areas"2 8 within a cluster development, localities are
prohibited from (i) requiring the identification of "slopes, species
of woodlands or vegetation and whether any of such species are
diseased, the locations of species listed as endangered, threat-
ened, or of special concern, or riparian zones" in those areas; (ii)
requiring that those areas be excluded from density calculations;
(iii) prohibiting the construction of roads used for access to the
cluster development in those areas; (iv) prohibiting the location of
storm water management areas in those areas; and (v) requiring
that cluster development lots directly abut those areas.2 0
X. FARM WINERIES
The Virginia secretary of agriculture and forestry has noted
that "[t]he Virginia wine industry is one of the fastest growing
segments of Virginia's diverse agricultural industry.""21 Indeed,
205. H.B. 1931, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2011) (enacted as Act of Mar. 25, 2011,
ch. 549, 2011 Va. Acts 869).
206. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2286.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2011).
207. Id.
208. "Open space" and "conservation areas" have the same meaning as "open-space
land" in Virginia Code section 10.1.1700. See id. § 15.2-2286.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2011) (re-
ferring to id. § 10.1-1700 (Repl. Vol. 2012)).
209. Id. § 15.2-2286.1(B).
210. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Virginia Wine Industry Jobs Grow by 50%;
Economic Impact Doubles, New Study Finds (Feb. 2, 2012), available at http://www.virg
iniawine.org/system/datas/344/original[Virginia -Wine-Industry-Jobs Grow-by-50-Econo
mic-mpact-Doubles-New-Study-Fin dspdf.
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the industry has seen significant increases in grape production
and winery construction since 2000.211 It contributes $747 million
annually to the economy of the Commonwealth, an increase of
106 percent over figures from a 2005 economic impact study.12 In
2006, the General Assembly added a new section to the Virginia
Code specifically protecting farm wineries from local regula-
tions.213 The adoption of this statute and the increasing develop-
ment and expansion of the Virginia wine industry has caused
friction between localities and winery owners that has played out
in various venues.
A. Court Decisions: Marterella v. Bellevue Landowners Council,
Inc.
In Marterella v. Bellevue Landowners Council, Inc., the Su-
preme Court of Virginia held that a trial court could not set aside
a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff vineyard owner. 14 In this
case, the Marterellas began to develop a farm winery on a lot in
the Bellevue Farms Subdivision.2 1  The Marterellas intended to
operate their farm winery for both the production of wine and the
on-site sale of wine to members of the public.' They believed that
both of these activities would be allowed on the lot they were de-
veloping based on a provision in the subdivision handbook which
provided that "[a]griculture is the only commercial activity ex-
pressly permitted under the covenants. Any other work that...
leads to regular visits by customers, suppliers, business associ-
ates or others, is not acceptable. 2 7 In 2005, the Marterellas re-
quested the Bellevue Landowners Council, Inc. ("BLOC") to allow
them to begin the on-site sale of wine.2 8 BLOC denied their re-
quest, but the Marterellas began selling wine despite BLOC's de-
211. See, e.g., Philip Carter Strother & Robert Jackson Allen, Wine Tasting Activities in
Virginia: Is America's First Wine Producing State Destined to Wither on the Vine Due to
Overregulation?, 23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 221, 230-31 (2006).
212. Press Release, Office of the Governor, supra note 210.
213. Act of Apr. 6, 2006, ch. 794, 2006 Va. Acts 1220 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-2288.3 (Cune. Supp. 2006)).
214. Marterella v. Bellevue Landowners Council, loc., No. 111625, slip op. at 5 (Va.
May 11, 2012).
215. Id. at 1.
216. See id.
217. Id. at 2 (first alteration in original).
218. See id. at 1.
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nial.219 BLOC subsequently petitioned the circuit court for injunc-
tive relief to prohibit the Marterellas from selling wine on their
property.2 ' BLOC argued that the Marterellas were selling wine
in violation of the subdivision's declarations and covenants; the
Marterellas argued that BLOC's claim was "barred by estoppel,
waiver and selective enforcement. 221
At trial, the Marterellas presented evidence that the subdivi-
sion's declarations and covenants were misleading and incon-
sistent and that other commercial activities were allowed else-
where in the subdivision.222 The Marterellas further testified that
they had "made a significant financial investment in their vine-
yard and winery.""22 Over BLOC's objection, the trial court sub-
mitted the Marterellas' estoppel plea to the jury, instructing it
that it could return a verdict for the Marterellas if (i) BLOC sug-
gested that the Marterellas' intended use was permitted; (ii) the
Marterellas relied on those suggestions; and (iii) the Marterellas
made financial investments in reliance on those suggestions. 4
The court further instructed the jury that it could return a verdict
for the Marterellas if BLOC had not been enforcing the covenants
uniformly in Bellevue Farms.2 Following deliberation, the jury
returned a verdict for the Marterellas; however, the court set
aside the verdict and entered final judgment for BLOC, holding
that "the term agriculture as 'commonly understood' [does] not
include the on-site retail sale of wine" and that the Marterellas
unreasonably interpreted the language.226
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the trial court's judg-
ment, holding that "[a] trial court may set aside a jury verdict on-
ly if that verdict is plainly wrong or without credible evidence to
support it."" 7 As no definition of agriculture was given in the jury
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1-2.
222. Id. at 2-3.
223. Id. at 3.
224. Id. at 2-3.
225. Id. at 3.
226. Id. at 3-4.
227. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-430 (Repl. Vol. 2007)).
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instructions, the jury was free to determine if its definition in the
228declarations and covenants included the on-site sale of wine.
The supreme court held that nothing in the instructions required
a finding of reasonableness, and thus that the trial court deviated
from the law by injecting a reasonableness standard following the
jury verdict.29 As there was no reasonableness requirement, the
jury's verdict was not plainly wrong, and the trial court therefore
erred by setting it aside.2 0
B. Attorney General Opinions
In an opinion dated August 2010, the attorney general clarified
his understanding of farm buildings and their relationship to the
Uniform Statewide Building Code ("Building Code").23' Under the
Virginia Code, farm buildings are defined as buildings used pri-
marily for farming operations.232 If a structure qualifies as a farm
building, it is exempt from the requirements of the Building
Code.3 If, however, it does not qualify, it must conform to the
Building Code's requirements.23'
The question presented to the attorney general was whether
the use of farm buildings to occasionally host events, such as con-
certs and weddings, would disqualify the structure from the "farm
building" definition and thus require it to conform with the Build-
ing Code, requiring the owner to obtain a new occupancy per-
mit.23' The attorney general determined that the crucial factor re-
garding the classification of a farm building is its primary use.236
The attorney general stated that, in his opinion, the inclusion of
the word primarily in Virginia Code section 36-97 indicated that
"the General Assembly contemplated that some non-specified us-
es would be made of these buildings."23 ' Ultimately, therefore, the
228. Id. at 4-5.
229. Id. at 5 (citation omitted).
230. Id.
231. Op. to Mr. Kevin J. Burke, Esq. (Aug. 23, 2010).
232. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-97 (Repl. Vol. 2011). Specific operations defined include (i)
storage and production of agricultural products, (ii) sheltering of livestock, (iii) offices re-
lating to the farm operations, and (iv) the storage of farm equipment. Id.
233. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-99(B) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
234. Op. to Mr. Kevin J. Burke, Esq. (Aug. 23, 2010).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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attorney general determined that the occasional use of farm
buildings for events would not constitute a change in their prima-
ry use and thus would not require the owner to obtain a new oc-
cupancy permit or comply with the Building Code.23
C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board Hearings: In Re Paradise
Springs Winery, LLC
This hearing involved the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control
Board ("ABC Board") granting a Class A Farm Winery License to
Paradise Springs Winery, LLC ("Paradise Springs") despite two
objections from the Fairfax County Board of Directors, the Fair-
fax County Board of Supervisors, the Fairfax County Zoning Ad-
ministration, and the local Noble Estates Homeowners Associa-
tion (the "County"). 3' Under the Virginia Code, the ABC Board is
granted the authority to license farm wineries for operation in the
Commonwealth of Virginia. 4° The ABC Board has broad discre-
tion for granting a license, but may consider the factors outlined
in code section 4.1-222 when deciding whether or not to do so.
241
The County objected to Paradise Springs' license application on
two counts under code section 4.1-222. 24
The County first objected on the grounds that the location of
the winery would "adversely affect real property values or sub-
stantially interfere with the usual quietude and tranquility of
[the] residential area.,143 This objection was based largely on the
contention that the winery would generate unsafe road condi-
tions, especially due to the narrow and winding nature of nearby
roads. 4 Furthermore, the County argued that the winery would
attract large numbers of visitors, disrupting the peaceful nature
of the neighborhood." Addressing these arguments, Paradise
Springs presented evidence showing that many members of the
238. Id.
239. In re Paradise Springs Winery, LLC, Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., Appl.
#056973, 1 (Sept. 3, 2009).
240. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 4.1-207, 4.1-222 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
241. See id. § 4.1-222 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
242. In re Paradise Springs Winery, at 3.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 11-15.
245. Id.
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local community desired the winery's opening because it would
preserve the rural nature of the community."' Additionally, it
presented evidence showing that other entities which attract
large numbers of people, such as parks and soccer fields, were al-
lowed to operate in the area.247 Finally, Paradise Springs showed
that other farm wineries around the state are similarly situated
in rural areas with winding, narrow country roads." 8
The County next contended that the ABC Board should deny
the license because the site that Paradise Springs had chosen did
"not conform to the requirements of the governing body of the
County.""4 The land on which Paradise Springs wanted to open
its winery was a 36-acre parcel zoned R-C (Residential Conserva-
tion), and most of the land was forested; however, a portion had
been cleared. 5' Paradise Springs' intent was to use five acres of
the open land for the production of wine, two-and-one-half of
Which would be used exclusively for growing grapes.2"' In Fairfax
County, agricultural uses are an acceptable accessory use permit-
ted in R-C districts; however, the local zoning administration de-
termined that Paradise Springs' winery would not qualify as an
agricultural use because the local zoning ordinance's definition of
"agricultural" did not include the production of wine from grapes
not grown immediately on the subject property.2"' As the owners
of Paradise Springs were not intending to grow one hundred per-
cent of the grapes used in their wine production on the site in
Fairfax County, the zoning officials analogized their intended use
to an establishment for production and processing, a use not per-
mitted in the R-C district.25 Considering that less than one hun-
dred percent of the grapes used would be grown on-site and that
the use was analogized to production and processing rather than
246. Id. at 16-22.
247. Id. at 20.
248. Id. at 21.
249. Id.; see also, VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-222(A)(2)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
250. In re Paradise Springs Winery, at 8, 16.
251. Id. at 6.
252. Id. at 8. The Virginia Code requires that for a winery to obtain a Class-A Farm
Winery license, at least fifty-one percent of the grapes used in producing the wine must be
grown on land owned or leased by the winery. See VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-219 (Repl. Vol.
2010).
253. In re Paradise Springs Winery, at 9.
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agricultural, the zoning administration denied Paradise Springs'
application for a special use permit.54
Following a hearing, the ABC Board found that both of the
County's objections were unsubstantiated.255 Addressing the first
objection, the ABC Board held that the winery's operation would
not "substantially interfere with the usual quietude and tranquili-
ty of the residential area. ,2 5 The ABC Board found that "[t]he
most persuasive evidence" with regard to this argument was that
other Farm Wineries across the state, situated on similarly nar-
row and winding roads, had been granted farm winery licenses. 5'
Furthermore, the ABC Board noted that similar crowd drawing
attractions are located around Paradise Springs' site.'
Addressing the second objection, the ABC Board held that the
Virginia Code does not require farm wineries to grow one hun-
dred percent of their wine-producing grapes on site.9 The ABC
Board first noted that the Virginia Code only requires a Class A
Farm Winery to use at least fifty-one percent of grapes grown on
land owned or leased by the farm winery and that Paradise
Springs had successfully shown that it would meet this fifty-one
percent mark.26 The ABC Board held that by essentially requir-
ing one hundred percent of Paradise Springs' grapes to be grown
on site, Fairfax County's zoning ordinance was inconsistent with
the Virginia ABC Act, and thus could not be used "to deny the is-
suance of a Class A Farm Winery license" to Paradise Springs.61
Furthermore, the ABC Board noted that the County's actions in
denying the special use permit violated Virginia Code section 4.1-
128(A), which states that no locality shall "adopt an ordinance or
resolution that prohibits or regulates the storage, warehousing,
and wholesaling of wine in accordance with Title 4.1, regulations
254. Id. at 8-9. The owners of Paradise Springs had, however, laid out three scenarios
for obtaining at least fifty.one percent of the grapes they needed for production from land
owned or leased by Paradise Springs. Id. at 6-7.
255. Id. at 23, 26.
256. Id. at 27.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 24.
260. Id. at 24-25.
261. Id. at 25-26.
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of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, and federal law at a li-
censed farm winery." '262
In Marterella, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided that a ju-
ry could find that the general definition of "agriculture" could in-
clude the on-site retail sale of wine. 23 Through the Paradise
Springs decision, the ABC Board determined that local ordinanc-
es were inconsistent with state regulations and issued a farm
winery license over the objections of the locality.2"4 These deci-
sions, taken together with the ABC Board's grant of authority
over alcoholic beverage matters within the Commonwealth and
the fairly recent Virginia Farm Winery Zoning Act,62 suggest that
the state government is expressing a desire to preempt localities
in farm winery regulation, except in the cases of very large scale
events and unreasonable outdoor amplified music.266
VI. CONCLUSION
From Tidewater in the East to Shenandoah to the Cumberland
Plateau in the West, the Commonwealth of Virginia covers
42,774.2 square miles of land and water.26 7 Since the turn of the
millennium, the Commonwealth's population has increased by
nearly one million individuals, and its population density has in-
creased from 179.2 persons per square mile to 202.6 persons per
262. Id. (quotingVA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-128(A) (Repl. Vol. 2010)).
263. See supra, text accompanying notes 214-30.
264. See supra, text accompanying notes 239-62.
265. Act of Apr. 6, 2006, ch. 794, 2006 Va. Acts 1220 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-2288.3 (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
266. These recent developments favoring a more comprehensive state-wide approach to
the farm winery industry in Virginia suggest a trend away from earlier decisions that al-
lowed for local regulations affecting alcoholic beverages to stand in light of title 4.1 of the
Virginia Code and ABC regulations. Two of the most seminal cases dealing with local reg-
ulation of alcoholic beverage sales are City of Norfolk v. Tiny House, Inc., 222 Va. 414,
424, 281 S.E.2d 836, 842 (1981) (holding that localities could use valid zoning ordinances
to regulate the location of establishments selling alcoholic beverages); and Cnty. of Ches-
terfield v. Windy Hill, Ltd., 263 Va. 197, 204, 559 S.E.2d 627-30 (2002) (holding that a lo-
cality could condition a use permit on the applicant not selling alcoholic beverages at his
establishment) (citing Tiny House, Inc., 422 Va. at 422-23, 281 S.E.2d at 841). The pas-
sage of the Farm Winery Act, exemptions from the building code for farm structures, and
the recent decisions in Marterella and Paradise Springs all suggest that if the Supreme
Court of Virginia was confronted with a local ordinance that attempted to regulate the
sale of alcohol on a farm winery, it may reach a different result than it did in Tiny House
and Windy Hill.
267. United States Summary: 2000, Population and Housing Unit Courts, tbl. 17,
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2O00/phc3-us-ptl.pdf.
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square mile.268 As Virginia's population continues to see a steady
increase and population densities rise, it is important for both in-
dividuals and the state to continue practicing responsible stew-
ardship of the Old Dominion's land in a manner that honors the
property rights of its citizens while promoting sustainable prac-
tices in land use.
268. Resident Population Data, Population Density, available at http://2010.census.
gov/2010census/data/apportionment-dens -text.php.
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